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Street-level bureaucrats are a fundamental part of the implementation process of any policy. This study 
provides an examination of the factors that shape the behavior of street-level bureaucrats at the frontlines 
of policy implementation. This study investigates how rebelliousness generates an impact on the 
discretion of street-level bureaucrats and to what extent client meaningfulness plays a moderating factor. 
It utilizes a survey questionnaire distributed among inspectors of the Department of Labor in the Ministry 
of Human Resources of Malaysia (n=241). The result of this study demonstrates that rebelliousness has a 
negative relationship with discretion, and client meaningfulness has a direct positive correlation with 
discretion. However, the relationship between rebelliousness and discretion is stronger with a high level 
of client meaningfulness. The objective of this study is to examine street-level bureaucrat behavior 
through the lens of Lipsky's theory which will provide an answer to the broad question of the factors that 
contribute to the existence of an imperfect implementation process. This study sheds light on the 
importance of client meaningfulness in moderating the behavior of street-level bureaucrats while 
interacting with inspectees. The novelty of this study is by highlighting two main constructs that are likely 
contributing to the implementation process by directly and indirectly impacting bureaucrats’ discretion: 
rebelliousness, and client meaningfulness. 
 





The concept of discretion is fundamental in the study 
of street-level bureaucracy. According to the street-level 
bureaucrats' theory by Lipsky (1980), frontline public 
employees exercise discretion when they interact with citizens 
during the policy implementation process. Frontline public employees are called street-
level bureaucrats are consistently interacting with citizens as part of their job. The 
decisions taken by these bureaucrats have a profound influence on the implementation 
process of any policy as these judgments are often within a legal discretionary space 
(Hupe & Hill, 2015). The ability to decide freely is conceptualized under the concept of 
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discretion. The ability of a bureaucrat to act accordingly and freely is critically shaped 
by many factors. Hence, this study stresses the importance of rebelliousness and client 
meaningfulness and its impact on the ability of bureaucrats to decide freely. 
 
Rebelliousness is understood as the perceived threat that a bureaucrat might 
experience while carrying out responsibilities at the workplace (Brehm & Brehm, 
2013). Also, rebelliousness is a concept that mainly deals with the individual’s response 
when their freedom to act is restricted (Tummers, Steijn, & Bekkers, 2012). Previous 
research on rebelliousness argues that rebellious bureaucrats experience personal 
conflict when deciding freely. Hence, bureaucrats who demonstrate this phenomenon 
will experience a limitation in their freedom to decide when implementing policies 
(Tummers, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, client meaningfulness refers to the perceptions of the street-
level bureaucrats on the benefits that a policy might offer to their clients (Tummers & 
Bekkers, 2014). Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) highlighted that street-level 
bureaucrats who experience positive client meaningfulness can implement policy 
successfully, this is support by the notion put forward by and Lipsky (2010) who has 
theorized that bureaucrats generally focus on helping their client to achieve policy 
implementation success. 
 
Tummers and Bekkers (2014, p. 528) argue that client meaningfulness has a 
direct impact on street-level bureaucrats' freedom to act. This relationship can be 
explained as if a schoolteacher who wants to provide the best teaching method, he or 
she is capable of, the teacher will do whatever is necessary within their discretion to 
implement new teaching methods that will improve the learning of the students. This 
example reflects how street-level bureaucrats when experiencing meaningfulness 
toward their clients and will implement the regulation and ensure that a positive impact 
on their clients for long-term success. Additionally, street-level bureaucrats theory 
argues that bureaucrats who experience more discretion will, to a certain degree, want 
to have a positive impact on their client’s lives (Lipsky, 2010; Palumbo, Maynard-
Moody, & Wright, 1984). 
 
In most countries, translating regulation into action poses a substantial challenge 
as it necessitates the bureaucrats to respond efficiently and effectively to all 
stakeholders (Hupe & Hill, 2015). This study was motivated by the fact that many 
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countries around the world share a common trend of weak policy implementation and 
specifically the enforcement stage. Munguia (2019) emphasized that developing 
countries, especially Southeast Asian countries, share a common trend of weakness in 
the implementation process, especially concerning labor laws. Also, these weaknesses 
are likely related to the enforcers themselves. Overall, the evidence suggests in 
developing countries, it is common for the implementation and enforcement of 
regulations to be at a low level of effectiveness (Almeida & Ronconi, 2016; Kanbur & 
Ronconi, 2018). 
 
Broecke, Forti, and Vandeweyer (2017) and Bhorat and Ravi Stanwix (2019) 
both have stipulated that regulation enforcement of labor laws and especially minimum 
wage regulation are deficient in developing countries. Bhorat and Ravi Stanwix (2019, 
p. 4) stated that “the literature does broadly agree that enforcement of and compliance 
with minimum wage laws are low in most developing countries. Formal enforcement 
efforts are weak, and a substantial proportion of workers still receive sub-minimum 
wages”. 
 
Ronconi (2010) argues that it is commonly not the absence of labor regulation in 
developing nations that are the problem.  Rather it is the large amount of non-
compliance with standing rules due to “imperfect enforcement”, coupled with the 
weakness in government institutions, capacity, and commitment to enforce regulation 
by the bureaucrats. 
 
Issues with the enforcement of labor laws, especially minimum wage regulation 
in Malaysia were stressed by M Kulasegaran, the previous Minister of Human 
Resources, who recently stated that “30% of employers are not complying with 
minimum wage ruling” (Bernama, 2019). Also, A study by the Malaysian Federal Bank 
(Bank Negara) in 2018 highlights that low-skilled workers in Malaysia wages are 
receiving less wages than other benchmarks economics that are similar to Malaysia 
labor productivity. The Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers urged the government 
to give a detailed roadmap for the implementation of the minimum wage policy (Lee, 
2020). 
 
Hence, the motivation of this study is to understand why there is a weak 
implementation and specifically during the enforcement stage of minimum wage 
regulation, by focusing on the examination of factors that shapes street-level 
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bureaucrats’ discretion. Therefore, this study focuses on labor inspectors as they play a 
significant role in implementing all labor laws in Malaysia. 
 
This study is governed by street-level bureaucrats’ theory which argues that the 
implementation process of any policy is fundamentally dependent on street-level 
bureaucrats’ behavior. The theory of street-level bureaucracy highlight discretion as a 
fundamental factor and argues that personal characteristics influence bureaucrats' 
discretion and ultimately will influence the whole implementation process. In this study, 
we focus on personal traits such as client meaningfulness and rebelliousness as the main 
constructs that are reshaping street-level bureaucrats' discretion (Tummers, Steijn, & 
Bekkers, 2012; Lipsky, 2010). 
 
The novelty of this study is by providing a comprehensive examination of the 
relationship between rebelliousness and discretion; also, to investigate the moderating 
role of client meaningfulness. This study will provide a new understanding of the 
factors that shape discretion to further the understanding of street-level bureaucrat 
behavior. Finally, by focusing on what factors may influence bureaucrats' discretion, 





Street-Level Bureaucrats Discretion  
 
The concept of discretion has been debated extensively in the literature, see 
Lipsky (1980), Saetren (2005), Durant, Maynard‐Moody, and Portillo (2011), and Hupe 
and Hill (2015). In this paper, the concept is conceptualized based on Evans's (2010) 
interpretation, and the scholar noted that discretion incorporates the bureaucrats’ degree 
of perceived freedom when deciding on policy implementation. Also, Davis (1969, p. 4) 
noted that “a public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power 
leave him free to choose among possible courses of action or inaction.” 
 
Moreover, Tummers and Bekkers (2014, p. 529) offered an irrefutable 
description of the concept as “the perceived freedom of street-level bureaucrats in 
making choices concerning the sort, quantity, and quality of sanctions, and rewards on 
offer when implementing a policy.” For example, discretion is the extent of freedom of 
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public lawyers who feel they can decide what and how to provide the best assistance to 
their clients (Berkman & Plutzer, 2010). In this study, we distillate discretion as the 
perceived freedom based on the bureaucrat’s perception; this is primarily grounded by 
Thomas Theorem, who argues that a person’s behavior is based on their perception of 
reality (Lewin, 1936). 
 
Discretion can also be defined as the “component in the decision-making 
process that determines an individual's action or non-action” (Carrington, 2005, p. 144). 
Carrington conceptualized discretion into two viewpoints, the first component is related 
to the freedom of the individual. In this case, the street-level bureaucrats must select 
between varied actions that are available to them, and discretion is fundamentally the 
choice to act or not act (Carrington, 2005).  
 
Based on street-level bureaucracy theory, Lipsky (2010) illustrates this concept 
as the judgments of street-level bureaucrats in line with their nature of service. He also 
argues that street-level bureaucrats are accountable for their own decisions which they 
are aware have a profound impact on their clients. 
 
Lipsky also added that street-level bureaucrats are often faced with situations 
that demand them to depart from service values and focus on coping with the 
expectation of the public. Furthermore, Lipsky argues that discretion is essential among 
street-level bureaucrats as it is a very crucial element to their interaction with the public 
daily. He argued that to comprehend street-level bureaucrat's discretion, there is a need 
to analyze the agency's internal factors and factors relating to their personal 
characteristics that contribute and shape their discretion (Lipsky, 2010). 
 
Bureaucrats have substantial discretion in determining the proper guidelines to 
apply and how policies are enforced. Policymakers may unswervingly inspire public 
employees to employ discretion to accomplish policy objectives (Brodkin, 1997). Other 
scholars also propose that discretion is an indirect action that bureaucrats implement as 
a coping mechanism to be able to achieve the inconsistency between street-level 
bureaucrats’ capacity and client’s needs and because of creating personal relationships 
with the clients (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). 
 
Street-level bureaucrats generally involve in a sensitive relationship with their 
clients, the ability to act freely will shape the behavior of those bureaucrats when 
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interacting with the public by shaping their decision with regards to who is deserving of 
punishment and whom to forgive. Also, Clients’ knowledge of the discretion of street-
level bureaucrats will be by experiencing the choices street-level bureaucrats make of 
what information they want to provide to them. Hence, this will determine the quality of 
the relationship. Discretion can also be experienced by clients by how bureaucrats 
choose to share services they can offer to their clients to assist them to comply with the 
enforcement of a policy (Meyers, Glaser, & Donald, 1998; Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007). 
 
Street-level bureaucrat’s freedom to make choices concerning their clients is an 
important factor that shapes the dealings between bureaucrats and clients, these 
interactions are the actual indicator of a policy outcome (Lipsky, 2010). Additionally, 
these public employees will be able to support or even harm the policy enforcement 
process, therefore, defining the policy outcomes Hence. tensions will emerge between 
policy necessities and the bureaucrat's ability to deliver services to citizens (Meyers et 
al., 1998). 
 
Even when policymakers and street-level bureaucrats do share an interest in the 
accomplishment of policy objectives, they must frequently function with clearly 
different priorities. Policymakers pursue to please stakeholder demands for visible 
results; a bureaucrat’s focus is to manage demands for competent performance 
combined with clients’ hopes for approachable services. Thus, bureaucrats must balance 
the demands from the policy and the demands of the clients, if not, the discretionary 
behavior of these individuals will subvert the policy implementation process (Meyers et 
al., 1998). 
 
Lipsky (2010) maintains that the human factor is fundamental to policy 
enforcement and that street-level bureaucrats will always maintain some freedom to 
make their own decisions. Discretion occurs when a street-level bureaucrat’s power 
leaves him or her free to choose among different likely courses of action (Davis, 1969). 
In other words, discretion can be viewed as the gap between the organization rules and 
guidelines in which frontline public employees exercise and the opportunity of a 
bureaucrat’s independence to make decision-making (Loyens & Maesschalck, 2010). 
Lipsky maintains that there will exist a space between policy intentions and how street-
level bureaucrats shape the policy outcome, and this is because the policy details are not 
concluded before implementation, or the policy goals are often not clearly detailed. 
Secondly, space might exist because of the pursuit of policy goals that are beyond 
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reach, this will demand from SLBs to be very responsive to challenges and issues and 




This concept is defined as “the motivational state that is hypothesized to occur 
when freedom is eliminated or threatened with elimination” Brehm and Brehm (2013, p. 
37). In the literature, this concept is referred to as “psychological reluctance” by Brehm 
(1966), the scholar also considered rebelliousness as a tool that maximizes the need for 
satisfaction of an individual who is facing a lack of appropriate freedom. The 
bureaucrat's reluctance originates from his or her own need for unrestricted discretion, 
as they strive to preserve independence during the decision-making process and 
eliminate any constraint on their freedom of choice (Pavey & Sparks, 2009). 
 
Rebelliousness is mainly a desire to restore a bureaucrat's behavioral freedom, 
and this is because bureaucrats are convinced that they possess legal individual freedom 
that allows them to act according to a formal operational procedure and the ability to 
make a decision based on discretionary limits (Lipsky, 2010). Hence, rebelliousness can 
be reflected as the amount of reluctance to act depends on the magnitude of the 
perceived threat to the individual’s freedom. The unpleasant motivational state of 
reluctance can result in cognitive and behavioral efforts to re-establish the person's 
freedom. This will inevitably be accompanied by the experience of hostility, 
aggressiveness, and anger (Rains, 2013). 
 
Rebelliousness has four fundamental elements, the first is the emotional attitude 
towards freedom of choice, which can be understood as bureaucrats' perception of the 
importance of having the freedom of choice while they are on the job and how they 
might react to any limitation on their ability to decide freely. The second element is the 
threat to freedom, which is defined as “any event that makes it more difficult to exercise 
freedom, constituting a threat to that freedom” (Burgoon, 2002, p. 222). The third 
element is reactance, which can be understood as the emotional response from the 
person that faces a threat to their freedom. This refers to the negative provocation and 
hostile feeling of bureaucrats who view their freedom as violated and perceive that their 
individuals' freedom to choose has been eliminated, it is also argued that the higher the 
impact of threat is, the stronger the rebellious behavior (Brehm & Brehm, 2013). The 
fourth element is the restoration of freedom. Brehm (1966) highlighted that if a person's 
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freedom is perceived to be threatened or eliminated, the individual would be motivated 
to re-establish such freedom, he also added “If a person’s behavioural freedom is 
reduced or threatened with reduction, he will become motivationally aroused. This 
arousal would presumably be directed against any further loss of freedom and to the re-
establishment of the freedom that had already been lost or threatened” (p. 2). 
 
Perhaps, a bureaucrat who experiences rebelliousness is an individual who 
refuses to act, advocating hostility and anger due to a particular threat that is limiting 
their freedom. In this context, bureaucrats' freedom is understood as their capability to 
act freely - also referred to as discretion. Hence, bureaucrats do experience reluctance 
due to a primary factor, this factor can be an attack on their freedom which is related to 
a perceived threat in the workplace from their clients, or an attack on their freedom by 
their colleague or the people they interact with such as their supervisors or managers 
(Brehm & Gates, 1999).  
 
Finally, this factor contributes to how these government employees use their 
freedom or discretion to undertake their responsibility at the workplace. Lipsky (2010) 
argues that street-level bureaucrats occasionally face the issue of psychological 
reactance, he highlighted that when a bureaucrat faces a threat on their ability to decide 
while on the job, they might display hostility and uncomforted. Also, bureaucrats will 
strive to restore that freedom of choice by developing coping mechanisms that will 
assist them in their elimination of these threats. In conclusion, street-level bureaucrats' 
freedom of choice and ability to act by employing their discretion is well connected to 
their state of mind, and their rebelliousness in the workplace and while on the job. 
 
The Moderating Role of Client Meaningfulness 
 
Client meaningfulness refers to “the perception of professionals about the 
benefits of them implementing the policy for their own clients” (Tummers et al., 2012, 
p. 12). Hence, client meaningfulness reflects the perception of the value that is added to 
the client by enforcing a policy during the implementation stage. This emotional feeling 
toward the client will determine the success of any policy. Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno (2003) highlighted that street-level bureaucrat who experiences client 
meaningfulness when implementing a policy are the frontline employees who focus on 
helping their clients achieve success and on building a relationship of trust and 
understanding, which reflects an increase on the level of compliance. 
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The concept of client meaningfulness is well connected to the concept of street-
level bureaucrats’ discretion and, the overall bureaucrats’ behavior. When bureaucrats 
experience meaningfulness toward their clients they tend to sense that they can assist in 
terms of making it accessible for clients to comply with the regulation. This, in turn, 
increases the bureaucrat's freedom to enforce a policy (Hupe & Hill, 2015). 
 
Consequently, the street-level bureaucrat who experiences a high level of 
discretion positively influences further client meaningfulness (Tummers et al., 2012). 
An interesting study that was done by Sandfort (2000) illustrates that in the case of the 
United States public welfare, street-level bureaucrats have demonstrated that when 
government employees experience client meaningfulness, they experience great 
discretion, which ultimately reflects a positive correlation between these two factors. 
 
Overall, client meaningfulness is a significant factor that is well documented in 
the study of bureaucrats, this construct does have an impact on discretion and the whole 
enforcement process. Therefore, client meaningfulness is related to the awareness 
bureaucrats have that their policy is valued and will bring benefits to their clients. The 
client's meaningfulness and discretion share a positive relationship where, when 
granting discretion during the policy, enforcement will increase client meaningfulness. 
Unrestricted discretion as the ability to decide freely makes it likely to alter policy goals 
toward client needs, which in turn increases the meaningfulness of the policy toward the 
client as street-level bureaucrats will act freely to ensure a positive outcome of the 
policy toward clients (Tummers & Bekkers, 2014). 
 
Based on the literature, the research hypothesis posted by this study are: 
 
H-1: Street-level bureaucrats who experience a high level of rebelliousness, will 
negatively influence their discretion.  
H-2: Street-level bureaucrats who experience a high level of client meaningfulness, 
will experience a discretion increase. 
H-3: The relationship between rebelliousness and discretion is stronger when street-
level bureaucrats experience a high level of client meaningfulness. 
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To examine the hypotheses presented in this study, primary data were gathered 
from labor inspectors working in the Department of Labor of the Malaysian Ministry of 
Human Resources. Permission to collect this data was acquired from the Department of 
Labor before distributing the survey questionnaire to the inspectors.  
 
In this study, the use of non-probability sampling is used as a method. That 
means the method was deemed more fitting for the purpose of the study as the research-
tested for a theoretical assumption. Hulland, Baumgartner, and Smith (2018) concluded 
that a study that uses theories to explain the phenomenon in a different context in the 
field of social science is likely an examination of theoretical generalization and not a 
sample generalization. Non-probability sampling is the correct method to be 
implemented. 
 
Purposive sampling is highlighted as a non-random technique that does need a 
set of several participants nor the need for underlying theory. To determine the sample 
size, the research determines the sample needed based on the people who are the 
targeted population and their willingness to provide information.  A non-probability 
sample means that the selection is the appropriate sample must be based on the shared 
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characteristics of the population. The objective of the sampling is fixated on the people 
with particular characteristics, mainly those who assisted in attained this study research 
objectives (Bernard, 2011; Hulland et al., 2018). The sample population is bureaucrats 
within the Labor department who have the discretion to enforce regulations. The only 
qualification criteria to be used to ensure that the survey target only labor inspectors is 
to focus on street-level bureaucrats who are called labor Inspectors who have the 
discretion to enforce regulations. 
 
Another approach was taken into consideration to ensure the appropriate sample 
size is implemented. The was following Hoogland and Boomsma (1998), and Wolf, 
Harrington, Clark, and Miller (2013) which reflected that a minimum of 200 
respondents is needed for the analysis of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The 
distribution of the survey was via the Google Form platform and sent to a total 
population of 350 labor inspectors in Malaysia. A total of 241 respondents had 
answered the online survey. Nevertheless, prior to conducting the survey, senior human 
resources were approached in each organization to ask permission for the study: once 
permission was granted, the survey was distributed. Survey packets containing the 
questionnaire and the covering letter explained the purpose of the survey, assured the 




i) Discretion was measured using 6-items adapted from Tummers (2012); this 
construct focuses on measuring the perceived freedom of the street-level 
bureaucrats when implementing a policy and was with a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.83. 
ii) Client meaningfulness was also adopted from Tummers (2012) using the 5-items 
scale and was with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86. 
iii) Rebelliousness was measured using a 12-item scale adopted from Shen and 
Dillard (2005) and was with a 0.83 Cronbach’s alpha value. 
 
Data Analysis and Result  
 
We examined the hypotheses by applying structural equation modeling (SEM) 
with partial least squares (PLS), using Smart PLS 3.2.8 software (Ringle, et al., 2015). 
According to Henseler, et al., (2009) and Hair et al., (2017), this is a powerful, robust 
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statistical procedure as it does not require strict assumptions about the distribution of 
the variables and is appropriate for complex causal analyses with both first- and second-
order constructs. Significantly, to test the statistical significance of the path coefficients, 
the PLS analysis used 5,000 subsamples to generate bootstrap t-statistics with n –1 
degrees of freedom (where n is the number of subsamples) (Al Halbusi et al., 2019).  
 
Demographic Analysis of The Respondents 
 
The demographic information of the respondents consists of (a) Gender, (b) 
Age, (c) Years of Experience, (d) Years as Labor Inspectors, and (e) Level of 
Education. Therefore, as shown in Table 1, in categorizing the gender of employees, it 
was documented that 47.3% of the respondents are male and 53.7% are female.  In 
categorizing the age, 3.3% of employees are between 18 to 24 years old, 27.8% are 
between the age of 25 to 34 years, 40.2% are between the age of 35 to 44, 24.8% are 
between the age of 45 to 54, and 3.7% are 55 or older. In terms of years of experience 
by categorizing the study subjects, 4.5.1% had worked in their organization for 1 year, 
14.5% of the employees worked between 2-5 years, 24.4% employees worked between 
6-10 years, 36.9% for whom worked between 11-20 years, 16.5% of the employees 
worked for 21-30 years and 2.9 has worked for 31 years and above. In regard to years as 
labor inspectors 12.4% for the inspectors among 1-2 years, 17.8% are for the inspectors 
3-5 years, 34.0% for the inspectors who worked 6-10 years, 18.6% for inspectors are 
11-15 years, and 17.0% are for the inspectors 16 years and above. In terms of 
educational level, 6.6% had SPM or high school, 25.3% had STPM/matriculation or 
pre-university, 53.5% completed bachelor’s degree, 14.1% had master’s degree, and 
0.4% had a Doctorate’s degree. 
 
Table 1: Demographic Analysis of the Respondents 
Demographic Item Categories Frequency Percentage 
Gender Male 114 47.3 
 Female 127 52.7 
 Total 241 100.0 
Age 18 to 24 8 3.3 
 25 to 34 67 27.8 
 35 to 44 97 40.2 
 45 to 54 60 24.8 
 55 or older 9 3.7 
 Total 241 100 
Years of Experience 1 year 11 4.5 
 2-5 years 35 14.5 
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 6-10 years 59 24.4 
 11-20 years 89  36.9  
 21-30 years 40  16.5  
 31 years and above 7 2.9 
 Total 241 100 
Years as Labor Inspectors 1-2 years 21 14.3 
 3-5 years 30 20.4 
 6-10 years 48 32.7 
 11-15 years 32 21.8 
 16 years and above 16 10.9 
 Total 241 100 
Level of Education SPM or high school 30 12.4 
 STPM/matriculation or pre uni 43 17.8 
 Bachelor’s degree 82 34.0 
 Master’s degree 45 18.6 
 Doctoral degree 41 17.0 
 Total 241 100 
 
Assessment of Common Method Variance (CMV) 
 
This study has employed one approach to controlling the common method 
variance (CMV). Cognitive Rigidity was used as a “Marker Variable” to control any 
method bias statistically. This variable, theoretically, is unrelated to the research model 
as it was used only for remedies. This statistical technique was endorsed by Chin et al. 
(2013) and Podsakoff et al. (2003). 
 
The study stressed that the common method bias control variable involved three 
items of ‘Cognitive Rigidity’. These are unrelated items to the main idea of this 
research. The common method of bias control items was shown to have an impact on 
each PLS model’s construct. This stage was followed by the path coefficients, which 
were estimated after introducing common method bias control constructs on the 
models’ constructs. Hence, that the original estimated path coefficient of Rebelliousness 
was observed to have a value of 0.215, and after analyzing the path coefficient with the 
marker items estimated by construct level correction (CLC) is with a value of 0.220. 
Thus, the results show that these changes are minor and deemed as insignificant. 
Therefore, based on the changes, the study found that common method bias in this study 
is not an issue. The results, as mentioned above, are indicated below in Table 2. 
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Path coefficients Path 
coefficients 
t-value t-value 
Rebelliousness -> Discretion 0.215 0.220 3.502 3.507 
Client Meaningfulness -> 
Discretion 
0.091 0.099 1.435 1.439 




We assessed the measurement model by following individual item reliability, 
internal consistency reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. Table 3 
indicated that the results revealed no serious problems with item reliability as most 
items exceed the recommended 0.707 level (Hair et al. 2017). To evaluate the 
constructs’ internal consistency, we used Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability; it 
ranged from 0.770 to 0.901 and from 0.787 to 0.915 respectively higher than the 0.70 
cut-offs (Hair et al., 2017). In support of convergent validity, the average variance 
extracted (AVE) for the constructs ranged from 0.658 to 0.727, in excess of the 0.5 
thresholds (Hair et al., 2017).  
 
Table 3: Measurement Model, Item Loadings, Construct Reliability 











Rebelliousness REBEL1 0.771 0.901 0.915 0.682 
 REBEL2 0.886    
 REBEL3 0.770    
 REBEL4 0.774    
 REBEL5 0.871    
 REBEL6 0.771    
 REBEL7 0.734    
 REBEL8 0.821    
 REBEL9 0.792    
 REBEL10 0.738    
 REBEL11 0.853    
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 REBEL12 0.811    
Client 
Meaningfulness 
ClMG1 0.835 0.778 0.787 0.727 
 ClMG2 0.781    
 ClMG3 0.750    
 ClMG4 0.838    
 ClMG5 0.751    
Discretion DISCR1 0.763 0.770 0.833 0.658 
 DISCR2 0.849    
 DISCR3 0.789    
 DISCR4 0.826    
 DISCR5 0.750    
 DISCR6 0.755    
Notes: CR= Composite Reliability, AVE= Average Variance Extracted 
 
For discriminant validity, we uncovered no issues; the AVE for each construct 
was greater than the variance that each construct shared with the other latent variables 
(see Table 3) (Hair et al., 2017). Henseler, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2015) propose an 
alternative, more reliable method, the heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT) of 
correlations, based on a multitrait-multimethod matrix. As Table 5 shows, the HTMT 
values are below 0.90, which confirms the discriminant validity of each pair of 
variables. 
 
Table 4: Discriminant Validity via Fornell and Larcker Criterion 
 Client Meaningfulness Discretion Rebelliousness 
Client Meaningfulness 0.654   
Discretion 0.519 0.677  
Rebelliousness 0.469 0.528 0.694 
Notes: Bold values on the diagonal are the square roots of the average variance extracted, shared between the 
constructs and their respective measures 
 
Table 5: Discriminant Validity via (HTMT Criterion) 
 Client Meaningfulness Discretion Rebelliousness 
Client Meaningfulness    
Discretion 0.490   
Rebelliousness 0.367 0.555  
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Notes: HTMT should be less than 0.90. 
 
Structural Model: Hypothesis Tests 
 
Table 6 presents the findings related to our H1–H2. In support of H1, 
rebelliousness relates negative to discretion (β = -0.269, t = 2.674, p < 0.004). Thus, H1 
is supported. For the H2 client meaningfulness was significantly related to discretion as 
hypothesis 2 was supported. 
 
To test our moderation prediction in H2, we used standardized scores of the 
variables, to minimize multicollinearity (Low & Mohr, 2001). We entered 
rebelliousness and client meaningfulness in Step 1, then their interaction term in Step 2. 
According to the results in Table 5, there is a significant rebelliousness and  client 
meaningfulness interaction effect (β = 0.195, t = 2.410, p < 0.008). Hence, H2 with the 
interaction effect is supported. To interpret this interaction, we followed Dawson (2014) 
and plotted high versus low street-level bureaucrats who experience a high level of 
client meaningfulness regression lines (+1 and –1 standard deviation from the mean). 
This step indicates that the negative relationship between rebelliousness and discretion 
weaken (slope is more pronounced) when client meaningfulness is high rather than low 
(Figure 2). In clear support of H3, the relationship between rebelliousness and 
discretion is reduced at high levels of client meaningfulness.  
 
Table 6: Structural Path Analysis: Direct Effect and Interaction Effect 



























0.195 0.172 2.410 0.008 
0.088;0.352 Accepted 
Notes: N=147. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. SE=standard error; LL=lower limit; CI=confidence interval; 
UL=upper limit 95% bias-correlated CI 
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The question posed by this study is how rebelliousness shapes street-level 
bureaucrats’ discretion. Rebelliousness is illustrated in the literature is when a 
bureaucrat demonstrates rebel or unorthodox traits while in contact with the public. 
These individuals view themselves as a person with limited freedom to act, with the 
central objective of protecting this freedom to act from any limitation (Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm & Brehm, 2013).  
 
This study is governed by street-level bureaucracy theory, which argues that 
personal characteristics of bureaucrats such as rebelliousness and client meaningfulness 
are factors that contribute to their behavior during the implementation process and also 
will reshape the interaction between the bureaucrats and the public by influencing 
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bureaucrat’s discretion during the enforcement stage (Hill & Hope, 2015; Lipsky, 2010; 
Tummers, Steijn, & Bekkers, 2012). 
 
Street-level bureaucrats in general who display rebelliousness are individuals 
who feel that someone or something is taking away their right to choose. Hence, 
rebelliousness produces the desire to restore a person's freedom, which directly affects 
the street-level bureaucrats' desire to employ discretion and act freely. Also, the 
literature argues that if the street-level bureaucrats show attitudes of reluctance, it will 
have a negative impact on discretion, thus, this study demonstrates a negative 
significant correlation between these two constructs as predicted by the literature 
(Brehm & Brehm, 2013; Shen & Dillard, 2005; Steindl, Jonas, Sittenthaler, Traut-
Mattausch, & Greenberg, 2015). 
 
This study indicates that the relationship between rebelliousness and labor 
inspectors' (street-level bureaucrats) discretion in Malaysia is negatively significant. 
The hypothesis posed by this study is that rebelliousness has a negative significant 
association with discretion which was supported by the data collected in this study, 
which means with a decrease in rebelliousness, the discretion of street-level bureaucrats 
will increase. This association is explained by Brehm and Brehm (2013), who argue that 
when bureaucrats experience rebelliousness to act it will negatively impact discretion 
because of these individuals’ sense that their freedom is suppressed. This is supported 
by the argument put forward by the theory of physical reluctance, which argues that 
reluctant individuals are likely to experience a loss or an attack on their freedom, and 
thus their freedom to decide is undermined. The concept of rebelliousness also 
maintains that individuals who are rebellious will be motivated to resist or counteract, 
which means that these individuals who feel that their freedom is compromised do tend 
to view their discretion as limited and sometimes the powers which are given to them as 
not sufficient to act and achieve their job goal. Furthermore, these individuals will 
minimize their own freedoms, as a method to protect whatever is left which will result 
in the difficulty of them freely making choices in their workplace. 
 
The literature discussing rebelliousness suggests that a rebellious bureaucrat will 
realize that his or her power to act is limited and view their ability to make a free 
judgment based on what they consider the proper course of action as unachievable. This 
is because the perceived freedom to make decisions is seen as taken away from them 
(Brehm & Brehm, 2013). 
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The literature does not assume any specific motive for bureaucrats to perceive 
that their freedom to act is threatened, and it is not addressed in the previous studies’ 
theoretical models (Brehm & Rozen, 1971; Brehm & Brehm, 2013). However, there is a 
limited discussion on what constitutes a threat to the freedom and discretions of 
bureaucrats. The main argument is that any kind of pressure put on the bureaucrats 
while doing their everyday job and while using their discretion, will constitute a threat. 
The concept emphasized that threat is caused by external pressure, where it is likely that 
the working environment and the people within this setting and the organization are 
causing a threat to personal freedom (Steindl et al., 2015).  
 
Lipsky (2010) has also argued that if the freedom of street-level bureaucrats is 
threatened, bureaucrats will resist efforts that limit their discretion. Lipsky also added 
that the discretion of bureaucrats is consistently threatened by factors relating to 
organizational factors or the client (inspectees), as they are responsible for the pressure 
that the bureaucrats face, which forces the bureaucrats to be reluctant in deciding and 
act freely when enforcing regulations. 
 
The result of this study can be explained by the notion that inspectors are likely 
to have found other ways to cope with the reluctance and the threat to their discretion by 
developing what Lipsky calls coping mechanisms. Lipsky (2010) concluded that street-
level bureaucrats experience pressures in the workplace; these individuals will develop 
ways to ease these pressures. Lipsky also added that due to the high demand for their 
services and the limited resources available, the street-level bureaucrats cannot fully 
meet the demands of the public. Hence, because of the exhausting work pressure they 
endure, the never-ending demands will deter them from making a positive impact on 
their clients (Durose, 2011; Nielsen, 2006; Winter & Nielsen, 2008). 
 
The result of this study reflects a significant correlation between client 
meaningfulness and discretion. A study by Lodenstein, Dieleman, Gerretsen, and 
Broerse (2016) suggested that street-level bureaucrat's perception of their clients relates 
to the possibility of the region they work in and if that country has citizen participation 
laws. This idea reflects that if such laws are in place, public employees are more likely 
to perceive their clients positively and accept their claims. In other words, how 
bureaucrats perceive their client demands and the legitimacy of their demands are a 
critical factor that shapes the client meaningfulness. The proposition made by the clients 
will also have a profound impact on how bureaucrats will react, and if the claims made 
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by the clients are based on an existing set of rights and are proved to be entitled to. 
Street-level bureaucrats will provide their services to ensure the demands of the client 
are fulfilled. However, street-level bureaucrats view their clients negatively when new 
demands are made. On this note, perceptions of street-level bureaucrats on the 
legitimacy of the demands and the needs of clients are based on widespread social 
understating of the social contract between the authority (bureaucrats) and the clients. 
Situations, where bureaucrats may perceive that the demands of their clients are genuine 
or were based on vested interests for the clients themselves, will ultimately shape the 
bureaucrat's behavior toward their clients. 
 
When examining the moderating role of client meaningfulness on the 
relationship between rebelliousness and discretion, the result demonstrates a stronger 
relationship with a high level of client meaningfulness. According to Tummers et al. 
(2012, p. 12), client meaningfulness can be understood as the perception of street-level 
bureaucrats regarding the benefits that they can offer to their clients when enforcing 
regulations. For instance, “do they perceive that they are helping their patients by 
implementing this policy?”. This relationship can be explained by the work of Durant et 
al. (2011) who cited that street-level bureaucrats rely on their discretion to achieve 
success in their job. Hence, the desire to employ discretion to achieve this success is 
dependent on how they perceive their client and the tendency of street-level 
bureaucrats’ willingness to help their clients. An early examination of this relationship 
was made by Sandfort (2000). The scholar concluded that street-level bureaucrats 
experience high levels of discretion, there was a positive influence on their perception 
of their client's meaningfulness. 
 
Finally, when taking into consideration the assumption made by street-level 
bureaucrats’ theory and that is personal characteristics have a profound impact on 
bureaucrat’s discretion and this claim is supported by the result of this study. The result 
represents an overall answer to the broad question of why there is imperfect 
enforcement, and that is because bureaucrats in Malaysia are experiencing 
rebelliousness which means that they do sense that their freedom is suppressed which 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
This study enhances the understanding of the implementation process by 
considering how variables within the street-level bureaucracy theory shape discretion, 
the inspectors, and how it impacts bureaucrat’s behavior. A key takes from the results of 
this study is that inspectors who exert rebellious behavior significantly shaped their 
discretion. This means that bureaucrats are experiencing constraints on their ability to 
decide freely. Also, client meaningfulness had a positive relationship with discretion. 
This means that street-level bureaucrats view their clients positively which is likely due 
to many clients’ minimum demands. Finally, bureaucrats’ client's meaningfulness 
impacts the relationship between rebelliousness and discretion as it shapes whether 
street-level bureaucrats perceive their clients as making genuine demands. This 
perception will contribute to the positive client meaningfulness of the bureaucrats. To 
ensure street-level bureaucrats’ interaction with the public is effective, proper training 
programs must be given to them to empower bureaucrats with the knowledge on how to 
interact with clients/citizens. Training programs must emphasize providing step-by-step 
guidance to bureaucrats on how to interact with clients depending on the client's 
situation and the problem they are facing (Lipsky, 2010).  
 
These training programs must focus on cultivating bureaucrats with the right 
strategy to implement regulations. A study by Mayntz (1984) has identified direct 
strategies that will help bureaucrats to enforce regulation effectively. The first is the use 
of command-and-control tools to reach policy objectives, this can be done through 
prioritizing clients who are historically known for a higher violation rate. secondly, 
bureaucrats must provide information to their clients regarding ways to comply with 
minimum wage regulations and information on the objectives of minimum wage policy 
and the benefits the policy brings to clients. This will increase the level of awareness of 
clients. As much of the non-compliance activities are due to the lack of information 
regarding a policy (Hupe & Hill, 2015; Lipsky, 2010). 
 
In conclusion, rebelliousness and client meaningfulness are important factors 
that shape how street-level bureaucrats interact with clients, these constructs have a 
profound impact on the discretion of bureaucrats and will determine the success of any 
regulation enforcement, training programs, and selection of the right individuals to be 
responsible for the enforcement process will likely have a fundamental impact on the 
implementation process. 
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Limitations of the Study  
 
No research is without any limitations. Firstly, the use of survey research has 
some limitations. Labor inspectors as respondents might have perceived that they as 
public employees are being evaluated indirectly. Hence, such factors might inflate their 
answers to represent their working environment and the issues they face while on the 
job and factors influencing their discretion as aspects that have little impact on them. 
However, to overcome this issue, the implementation of the average score is applied to 
reduce the effect. Second, the street-level bureaucrats may have considered the 
independent variables in this study as factors that are not of interest to them or might 
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